



NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

**COUNTER IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES  
CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE**

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**To:** See distribution list (Annex A)

**Date:** 29 January 2016

**Subject:** Final Report from 5<sup>th</sup> C-IED COE Lessons Learned Workshop, 01-03 Dec 2015.

### 1. Introduction

The Counter Improvised Explosive Devices Centre of Excellence (C-IED COE) conducted its fifth C-IED COE Lessons Learned workshop (LL WS) from 01 to 03 December 2015 at the C-IED COE, Hoyo de Manzanares in Spain. The workshop was open for NATO nations, NATO Commands, Partnership for Peace (PfP), RSM, Contributing Nations, EDA, USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, US FBI, and United Nations representatives.

The overarching topic of the workshop was:

**“C-IED Defense Capability Building (DCB) and Security Forces Assistance (SFA) processes”**

This topic includes C-IED findings from Africa, Middle East, Afghanistan, Ukraine and Asia and was attended by 78 participants from 21 nations and 9 military and civilian police agencies.

### 2. Aim

- Identify the primary lines of effort, programs, challenges regarding C-IED Defense Capability Building (DCB) or Security Forces Assistance (SFA) processes and the possible ways to address those challenges. The results of the WS will feed the NATO Lessons Learned Database for the improving of NATO and national operations. To visualize the impact of regional instability and its effects on NATO and European national domestic security.;
- To increase the knowledge of missions that different nations/agencies are conducting in countries with a high IED threat in order to facilitate and enhance interaction in the multinational C-IED community;
- To provide an opportunity to share information regarding CIED Defense Capacity Building
- Development of possible solutions and recommendations for CIED DCB

### 3. Method:

- Three main geographic areas: Africa-Middle East / Baltic-Ukraine / Asia- South America
- Briefing from organizations, nations and by staff DCB leads providing updated status of the C-IED DCB processes -ongoing around the globe
- Five moderated panel discussions made up of regional experts in the DCB program and processes.

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### 4. Panel and Recommendations:

#### Panel 1: Current C-IED DCB programs

#### **Obs 1: The DCB challenges discussed during the LLWS 2014 remain unresolved.**

- 1- The challenge to coordinate and share information between different organizations (NATO, UN, EDA, EUetc), that are supporting nations in different areas of operations, remains the primary barrier.. This was identified at the previous LLWS in 2014 and in most international events that the CIED COE participates in. This includes: The lack of a standardized lexicon that is recognized and used by NATO, EDA, UN, nations and partners. The use of different C-IED lexicons increases the risk of misunderstandings and hamper the possibilities to fuse and disseminate information from different operations, organizations, agencies, nations etc.
- Different nations, agencies and organizations have different aims and objectives which are reflected in the different COAs, lines of efforts, desired end-state etc. For example, some organizations are more focused on monitoring than countering the IED threat.
- The need for increased cooperation between different organizations and nations in order to enable the community of interest to identify and avoid duplication of work and/or identified existing gaps between the ongoing and conducted C-IED related DCB projects.
  - At this moment some organizations, e.g. UNMAS, have limited detailed information regarding what DCB the different nations are conducting in theatre. There is a need to improve the DCB related reporting (AAR, back brief etc.) from the operations. Ideally this would include defined and detailed information of what C-IED training, support etc that has been conducted, however a simple spreadsheet listing each nation, the training subject and a point of contact would be exceptionally helpful. This information can then be provided to the C-IED Community of Interest (e.g. UN, NATO, EDA, etc) in order to enable bilateral cooperation. A helpful example was the comprehensive list of US AFRICOM DCB / TSC events planned for 2016. This product has good potential to be the framework that other nations might consider using.
  - The COE is supporting NATO HQ (ESCD) in the development of a C-IED DCB Matrix that provides a basic tool to compare a partner nations "IED Threat" to its ability to safeguard NATO technology and CIED TTP

#### 2- Implications for NATO:

- Increased cooperation between NATO, NATO nations, UN, EDA and other partners will enable NATO increase regional threat situational awareness and to assess the need of C-IED related DCB in different theatres. To achieve this a standardization regarding reporting C-IED related DCB from the theatre is required.
- Use of a common C-IED lexicon is needed IOT increase effectiveness of the cooperation with different partners and increase the possibility of collecting statistically valid data in support of trend analysis.
- It's important that CIED DCB Lessons Identified must be input into the NATO CIED Lessons Learned process

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- NATO needs to add identified critical DCB recommendations (LI) in the C-IED Action plan
- NATO-nations should adapt the C-IED related DCB support to the current situation in line with the nations to prioritize and donate equipment that is commensurate with the nations capability. The DCB support should be conducted both bottom-up and top-down

**Obs 2: NATO, allied nations and other organizations need to adapt the level of DCB to the validated requirements and the supported nation's capability.**

- In some areas NATO and nations have a high ambition and a long term DCB plan that reaches longer than supported nations ambitions. NATO and nations need to adapted DCB planning and programs to the current situation. In some instances, the supported nations are fighting for their existence and are focused strictly on maneuver based combat operations and force protection for their soldiers. This operational reality must be part of the analysis when considering a sophisticated CIED processes and programs.
- On other hand it is important to build national capability over time, and not focus solely on short term capacity. Donor nations should limit their support to equipment/technology that the accepting nations/units have ability to handle the by themselves from a long term sustainability perspective.

Implications for NATO:

- It's important that NATO and NATO nations are adapting the C-IED related DCB support so it's in line with the supported nations priorities, capability and willingness from both a long and short term perspective.

**Other Observations:**

- DOTMLPF-PI (or similar) insure broad understanding of capability development proposals
- Train the Trainer (T3) must be the standard for any DCB training programs. Multi-year sustainment and monitoring must be considered from onset. Training should include senior leaders early in the process to confirm willingness to support long term development programs.
- Host Nation (HN) must have strong "buy in" and willingness to make requisite changes
  - Policy, Laws, Judiciary, long term human capital development
  - HN should be defining the requirements, as well as the solutions
  - Any assessment on the local situation describes how present capabilities can potentially be developed. HN should not be compared to NATO standards
  - A well-positioned, respected HN Senior Leader must take ownership of implementation
  - Adjust expectations, standards, understanding and equipment decisions based on threat and capability of contributing nation.
- Unless the systems are simple and clearly understood they will not be used. Any system implemented must be clear at all levels and able to be carried out by indigenous leaders and their forces.

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### Panel 2: Regional instabilities, impact on NATO and EU nations

**Obs 1:** New enemy TTP's require a reassessment of armaments. For example, the IS / Daesh use of up-armored Vehicle Borne IEDs (VBIEDs) requires ground units to be equipped with short/medium range Anti-Tank weapons (such as AT-4) in order to disable or destroy the mobile VBIED at a safe distance.

Implication for NATO:

- NATO needs to improve information sharing to guarantee member nations have access to the most recent information regarding enemy TTP's.
- Member nations still tend to overclassify information, making it difficult to share. Nations and commands are still not embracing the concept of „write to release“ or use of tear-lines in reporting.

**Obs 2:** For DCB to be effective a long term (at least 3 years) continuous effort is needed. While „presence“ is preferred in order to subvert and maintain SA, in some instances this can be achieved via periodic SLS and refresher training for the Host Nation key leaders and trainers.

Implication for NATO: DCB needs NATO level planning and coordination with a planning cycle of at least 3 years.

**Obs 3:** Enduring DCB programs often require low technology, sustainable training & equipment solutions.

Implication for NATO: NATO should define a baseline for training that fits the low technology and sustainable requirements.

**Obs 4:** Member nations frequently go for tactical level solutions (appears to be a quicker fix), the operational and strategic level tend to be forgotten/neglected.

Implication for NATO: DCB needs NATO level planning and coordination to cover all the levels, from tactical to strategic. Without national program to sustain a capability, tactical level solutions can only be successful in the short term.

**Obs 5:** It appears to happen often that similar training is delivered by different member nations which are unaware of each other's efforts.

**Obs 6:** Resource Scarcity, and Ethnic and Religious conflicts are the original genesis of the destabilizing conflicts.

Implication for NATO: NATO planners must remain aware of the original drivers of instability within the Operational Environment in order to insure that DCB ambitions and program objectives are feasible and attainable.

**Obs 7:** Lead Nation, agency model in order to achieve a measure of Unity of Effort, between partners. Consider smaller multi-lateral or partnering rather than struggle for the entire alliance.

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### Recommendations:

- Develop a training requirements baseline, covering the low-medium-high level of training. These levels should match the level of the IED threat and the host nation's security status and development possibilities.
- NATO should re-assess the information sharing procedures with regards to operations and set stricter guidelines for classification to prevent over classification.
- The NATO Lessons Identified-Lessons Learned process needs to be revised in a way to better reflect the quick changing nature of the IED fight.

### Panel 3: Operational-Tactical DCB LL/Recommendations

**Obs 1:** Hybrid exploitation approaches – must be flexible. Need for knowledge (dissemination) throughout system.

**Obs 2:** Over classification / national policies are still the number 1 barrier to effective info sharing; impacting DCB. If nations were to remove info about casualties and any possible tactical errors, much more information would be able to be shared.

**Obs 3:** IED Level 1 reporting and Tactical Site Exploitation (TSE) are fundamental for IED threat understanding for HN as well as for NATO nations

- Consider training basic tactical site exploitation (TSE) to Infantry and Engineer formations to mitigate lack of WIT and IEDD teams
- "Remote IED exploitation" via basic digital photography guidance can help mitigate WIT shortages

**Obs 4:** French CIEL-Level 2. Light and easily deployable capability works. Material coming out of CIEL is on NATO restricted servers, not confidential unless there are casualties. REL to everyone authorized (UNMAS, included). Highly qualified people and basic supplies but a lot of experience.

Implication for NATO: NATO use of CIEL or other light and highly mobile labs as part of NRF or VJTF exercises would benefit the lab staff and more importantly, educate the NFS on how to conducted integrated exploitation planning during an operation.

**Obs 5:** "All Arms CIED Drills" are the most effective means to reduce IED casualties from military and police

- Basic DtD focus is low tech, high pay-off and does not threaten release of sensitive info
- AtN discussion must be clear: AtN skills for HN or for the benefit of alliance understanding

**Obs 6:** Some HN (and some NATO) leaders do not understand Weapons Tech Intelligence (WTI). WTI is a fundamental element of CIED AtN efforts.

**Obs 7:** Overwhelming majority of Daesh IEDs are made of HME, KCI, ANFO, TATP, etc. Tunneling IEDs are increasingly being used due to the industrial scale of production of HME. Just as we have encouraged local nationals to reduce flow of fertilizer in Pakistan, similar efforts are underway in Turkey.

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Implication for NATO: At the senior diplomatic level, NATO and national leaders could make the subject of “end use monitoring” of high risk HME pre-cursor chemicals” a subject for engagements in the region. Discussion of possible CIED DCB programs with HN leaders could be contingent on HN active measures to control high risk precursors chemicals.

**Obs 8:** In places where there is more than one actor, there needs to be HIGH LEVEL coordination and cooperation.

**Obs 9:** NATO must request action/show of proof that nation is doing something with support/training.


Implication for NATO: NATO diplomats must be clear in communicating the requirement for a HN to develop a viable Concept of Operations (CONOP) for how a CIED capability is to be employed, resourced and sustained.

### Panel 4: UKRAINE

**Obs 1:** Program of instruction, like in most cases, must be partner developed. Accept risk early to leverage learning of an organization. Run the course multiple times and refine POI. End state must be a measureable, achievable target.

**Obs 2:** Training: for the long haul. Continuity of SMEs and participants is the only way to build lasting relations.

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### List of Annexes

- A. Distribution list
- B. C-IED DCB: Who is doing What

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**Annex A: Distribution list**

**Action:**

ACT Distribution List III	ACT IPT
ACT Distribution List VI	ACT LL
ACT Distribution list V	SHAPE / LL
AIRCOM Ramstein	JFCB/DCOS OPS
MARCOM Northwood	JFCN/DCOS OPS
LANDCOM Izmir	JALLC
ARRC Innsworth	JFTC, Bydgoszcz
RRC-FR, Lille	JWC, Stavanger
EUROCORPS, Strasbourg	NATO School, Oberammergau
NRDC-ESP, Valencia	1 (GE/NL) Corps, Munster
NRDC-IT, Solbiate	MNC-NE, Szczecin
NRDC-GR, Thessaloniki	RS C-IED Branch
NRDC-TUR, Istanbul	NMIOTC, Chania
PIAM, France	
COE JAPCC	COE DAT
COE EOD	COE HUMINT
COE MILENG	COE C2
COE JCBRN	COE MP
COE CSW	
JIEDDO/LL	EDA/Eu ops centre/ops analysis cell

**Information:**

C-IED COE Sponsoring Nations  
 LL WS @Participants

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**Annex B: C-IED DCB: Who is doing What**

WHO	WHERE	WHAT
NATO	Jordan, Ukraine etc.	
AFRICOM	Training in Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Niger, Mali, Chad, Senegal, Tanzania, Malawi, Burkina Faso	Offering to work together with training in all of AFFRICOM's locations and volunteering their schedule as well.  AFRICOM and PACOM – find out which nations can train civilian police.
UNMAS		Does not counter IED. Advice, assist, mentor and train. DPKO IED threat mitigation guidelines. Situational awareness tool.
DOS ATA	USA /south Asia (Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines) West Africa (8 nations)	Train in bomb disposal, advanced, underwater, post blast procedures. IED awareness program
TEDAC	USA	Level 3 laboratory. Gather and share intelligence on devices/ provide support to partners
FRANCE	MALI	Light Level 2 laboratory (CIEL) / CITHARE database available
IRELAND	Ireland	Could offer international training
US Army (20 CBRNE)	Iraq/Kuwait	Courses for EOD Iraqi forces/support of CENTCOM / US C-IED TF ATLAS
RSM (NATO)	Afghanistan	C-IED / EOD courses. DCB program
USAREUR/Canada	UKRAINE	C-IED program of instruction
USARPAC/APCFC	12 Asia countries	C-IED/EOD program of instruction/training irregular warfare analysis/identity activities

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